Quantum computing could undermine widely used public-key encryption, driving research into quantum-resistant algorithms and secure migration planning.
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Background for this topic.
Quantum computing uses quantum-mechanical effects in qubits to solve some problems differently from conventional computers. In information security, its significance is primarily cryptographic: a sufficiently capable, fault-tolerant quantum computer could use Shor’s algorithm to break RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, which protect certificates, key exchanges, signatures, and encrypted archives. Quantum computing is not expected to break all cryptography equally; symmetric encryption and cryptographic hashes generally require larger security parameters rather than replacement for the same reason.
The practical concern is “harvest now, decrypt later”: adversaries can collect encrypted traffic today for future decryption, especially when data must remain confidential for years. Organizations should inventory public-key algorithms and long-lived sensitive data, assess dependencies such as certificates and protocols, and plan migration to standardized post-quantum cryptography with crypto-agile systems. Quantum key distribution is a separate, specialized communications approach; it does not replace endpoint security, authentication, or conventional key-management controls and has significant deployment constraints.
Getting accurate visibility into IT and OT systems will be compounded by multivendor environments, misaligned update life cycles, and interoperability gaps.
President Trump signed an executive order on June 22 setting hard deadlines for federal agencies to move high-value assets and high-impact systems to post-quantum cryptography
All US federal agencies will have to complete their post-quantum cryptography transition by 2031, according to a new Trump Executive Order