MFA reduces account takeover by requiring another proof of identity, limiting damage from stolen passwords; protect fallback and recovery paths too.
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Background for this topic.
MFA requires a user to prove identity with at least two different factor types: something they know, have, or are. It limits account takeover when a password is exposed, but protection depends on the factors and their implementation; two passwords are not independent factors, and a one-time code delivered by SMS is generally weaker than a phishing-resistant credential.
Attackers may steal or relay one-time codes through phishing, trigger repeated push prompts to induce approval, exploit weak enrollment or account-recovery processes, or hijack an authenticated session after MFA succeeds. Prefer phishing-resistant methods such as FIDO2/WebAuthn security keys or platform credentials for sensitive access, protect enrollment and recovery as strongly as login, restrict weaker fallbacks, and monitor unusual authentication activity. MFA reduces risk but does not replace endpoint, session, or privileged-access controls.
CloudSEK said that in some applications such as WhatsApp, attackers could also bypass 2FA
Researchers find that the encryption of a user's 2FA secrets are stripped after transportation to the cloud.
Google is bringing end-to-end encryption to Google Authenticator cloud backups after researchers warned users against synchronizing 2FA codes with their Google accounts. [...]
You waited 13 years for this feature in Google Authenticator. Now researchers are advising you to wait a while longer, just in case...
The Google Authenticator app has received a critical update for Android and iOS that allows users to back up their two-factor authentication one-time passwords (OTPs) to their Google Accounts and have multi-device support. [...]